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Abstract
Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question:
what is the purpose of its conception of confirmation for scientific
inquiry? In this paper we argue that no Bayesian conception of con-
firmation can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take
to be saying how worthy of belief various hypotheses are. Then we
consider a different use Bayesian confirmation might be put to, namely
to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus
to decide which experiments to carry out. Interestingly Bayesian con-
firmation theorists rule out that confirmation be used for this purpose.
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1 Introduction
Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what is the
purpose of its conception of confirmation for scientific inquiry, broadly con-
strued? In this paper we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation
can be used for guiding or prescribing epistemic states, or for guiding or pre-
scribing experimental actions. First we argue that no Bayesian conception
of confirmation can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take
to be saying how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. Then we consider
a different use confirmation might be put to, namely to determine the epis-
temic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to decide which experiments
to carry out. Interestingly, however, Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out
that confirmation be used for this purpose. We conclude that there is no need
to supplement the general Bayesian framework with Bayesian confirmation
theory. Bayesian confirmation is a means with no end.1
1In this paper we focus on showing that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can
serve the purpose of guiding or prescribing epistemic states or experimental actions. In
other words, we focus on showing that Bayesian confirmation theory, qua normative theory,
is a means with no end. An anonymous referee for this journal has raised the point that the
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We argue as follows. Bayesian confirmation theory defines confirmation
as a relation between evidence, hypothesis, background assumptions, and
some probability measure. The probability measure is interpreted as an
agent’s degree of belief function. Since the agent’s degrees of belief are used
to determine whether the evidence confirms the hypothesis, confirmation
cannot be used to determine the agent’s degrees of belief, that is, how worthy
of belief the hypothesis is.
Next we consider a popular measure of incremental confirmation and
show that it can be used to determine the epistemic value of experimental
outcomes. Standard decision theory then allows us to form the expected
epistemic value of an experiment, and thus to decide which experiments to
carry out. Finally we look at the notion of confirmation Bayesian confirma-
tion theorists want to explicate. We find that one particular criterion they
impose on their explicans, viz. that old evidence should be able to provide
confirmation, explicitly rules out that it be used to determine the epistemic
value of experimental outcomes. This implies our negative conclusion.
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we present the tenets of Bayesian
confirmation theory. In section 3 we argue that no Bayesian conception of
confirmation can be used to say how worthy of belief certain hypotheses
are. In section 4 we find that there is a Bayesian conception of confirmation
that can be used to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes.
However, we also show that this possible use is ruled out – in some cases ex-
Bayesian conception of confirmation might serve the purpose of explaining or describing
the epistemic relationship between hypotheses and evidence. Even if that were the case,
our conclusion – that Bayesian confirmation theory, qua normative theory, is a means with
no end – would not be affected. Furthermore, in light of work by psychologists such as
Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky [1973], Tversky and Kahneman [1983])
we are skeptical that Bayesianism is a descriptively adequate theory. Since it is not clear
to us to what extent a descriptively inadequate theory can be explanatory, we are skeptical
of the prospects for an explanatory version of Bayesian confirmation theory.
3
plicitly, in others implicitly – by proponents of Bayesian confirmation theory.
We conclude in section 5.
2 Bayesian Confirmation Theory
Bayesian confirmation theory is defined within the general Bayesian frame-
work. The latter consists of the synchronic norm that an agent’s degrees
of belief should obey the probability calculus and the diachronic norm that,
depending on the format of the new information received, the agent’s degrees
of belief should be updated by strict conditionalization or Jeffrey condition-
alization (Jeffrey [1983a]) or Field conditionalization (Field [1978]).
Bayesian confirmation theory adds two notions of confirmation to this
general Bayesian framework: absolute confirmation and incremental confir-
mation. According to both notions confirmation is a relation between evi-
dence E, hypothesis H, background assumptions B, and some probability
measure Pr (and some formal language of sentences or algebra of proposi-
tions, which may be ignored for present purposes).
Evidence E is said to absolutely confirm hypothesis H relative to back-
ground assumptions B and probability function Pr if and only if the condi-
tional probability of the hypothesis given the evidence and the background
assumptions is sufficiently high, Pr(H | E ∩B) > r, where r is a number not
smaller than 1/2, but smaller than 1. The degree of absolute confirmation of
hypothesis H by evidence E relative to background assumptions B is defined
as the conditional probability of the hypothesis given the evidence and the
background assumptions, Pr(H | E ∩B).
Evidence E is said to incrementally confirm hypothesis H relative to
background assumptions B and probability function Pr if and only if the
conditional probability of the hypothesis given the evidence and the back-
ground assumptions is greater than the probability of the hypothesis given
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merely the background assumptions, Pr(H | E ∩ B) > Pr(H | B). The de-
gree of incremental confirmation of hypothesis H by evidence E relative to
background assumptions B is defined as the distance between the conditional
probability of the hypothesis given the evidence and the background assump-
tions, Pr (H | E ∩B), and the probability of the hypothesis given merely the
background assumptions, Pr (H | B). There are several ways to measure dis-
tance (Earman [1992], ch. 5), and there are other quantities the distance
between which can be measured (Joyce [2003]). The way distance is mea-
sured, and the quantities between which it is measured, affect the validity of
various arguments in Bayesian confirmation theory (Bro¨ssel [2013]; Fitelson
[1999]). However, these differences do not matter for present purposes.
The probability measure figuring in these definitions of confirmation is
typically interpreted as an agent’s actual or rational degree of belief func-
tion. Subjective Bayesians hold that the probability function is interpreted
as the agent’s actual degree of belief function, properly idealized. Objective
Bayesians hold that the probability function is interpreted as the degree of
belief function the agent objectively ought to have (Williamson [2010]), or
as the degree of belief function the agent is rationally justified to (Maher
[2004]).
3 Bayesian Confirmation and Belief
Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what is the
purpose of its conception of confirmation for scientific inquiry, broadly con-
strued? In this section we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation
can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take to be saying
how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are.
Intuitively, we should believe or accept those hypotheses that are well
confirmed. For example, suppose the NASA announces that the analysis of
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data from a moon probe confirms the existence of H2O. This is generally
taken to provide reason to believe or accept the hypothesis that there exists
H2O on the moon. Hence, pre-theoretically the information that a hypothesis
has been confirmed provides reason to believe or accept this hypothesis.
Saying how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are is also the purpose
the founding father of confirmation theory intends for confirmation. In his
seminal “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation”, Hempel writes:
It is now clear that an analysis of confirmation is of fundamen-
tal importance also for the study of the central problem of what
is customarily called epistemology; this problem may be charac-
terized as the elaboration of “standards of rational belief” or of
criteria of warranted assertibility. (Hempel [1945], p. 7)
We claim that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for this
purpose. The reason for this is purely conceptual and consists in the fact
that Bayesian confirmation theory presupposes that this question is already
answered.
Recall that, according to Bayesian confirmation theory, confirmation is
a relation between evidence, hypothesis, background assumptions, and some
probability measure. The probability measure is typically interpreted as an
agent’s (subjective or objective) degree of belief function. This means that
confirmation is itself defined in terms of (subjective or objective) degrees
of belief. Therefore it cannot be used to say how worthy of belief certain
hypotheses are without presupposing that this question is already answered.
This is so even if we grant, as we do, that the complete probability function
(the complete probability space, if we include the language or algebra) as
well as the evidence and background assumptions are transparent to the
agent. The reason is simply that Bayesian confirmation theory interprets the
probabilities as the agent’s (subjective or objective) degrees of belief.
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Let us go through this argument in more detail. In order to say whether
evidence E confirms hypothesis H relative to background assumptions B and
probability measure Pr we must specify the probability measure Pr. First
consider subjective Bayesians. They interpret the probability measure Pr
as the agent’s actual degree of belief function, properly idealized. Hence we
must specify the agent’s actual degrees of belief before we can say whether the
evidence confirms the hypothesis. Therefore we cannot use the information
that the evidence confirms the hypothesis in order to specify the agent’s
actual degrees of belief.
Next consider objective Bayesians. They interpret the probability mea-
sure as the degree of belief function the agent objectively ought to have, or
as the degree of belief function she is rationally justified to. Hence we must
specify the degrees of belief the agent objectively ought to have, or the de-
grees of belief she is rationally justified to, before we can say whether the
evidence confirms the hypothesis. Therefore we cannot use the information
that the evidence confirms the hypothesis to say which degrees of belief the
agent objectively ought to have, or which degrees of belief she is rationally
justified to.
Our argument works as long as the probability measure in terms of which
confirmation is defined is interpreted as the agent’s (subjective or objective)
degree of belief function in the sense of which confirmation should say how
worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. There are two options to escape the
negative conclusion of our argument that Bayesian confirmation is a means
with no end. The first option is to say that the probability measure in
terms of which confirmation is defined – call it the confirmation function – is
different from the agent’s (subjective or objective) degree of belief function.
The second option is to say that confirmation is a means to some end other
than saying how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are.
Let us consider the prospects of the first option according to which the
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confirmation function is interpreted in terms of something other than the
agent’s degrees of belief. An attempt along these lines, motivated by the
problem of old evidence (see the next section) and championed by Howson
and Urbach ([1993], [2006]), is to identify the confirmation function with the
agent’s counterfactual degree of belief function. The proposal is that
the support of H by E is gauged according to the effect which
one believes a knowledge of E would now have on one’s degree of
belief in H, on the (counterfactual) supposition that one does not
yet know E. (Howson and Urbach [1993], pp. 404–405, notation
adapted; see also Howson and Urbach [2006], pp. 297–301)
The counterfactual strategy as developed by Howson and Urbach ([1993],
[2006]) is generally considered unsuccessful as a solution to the problem of
old evidence (Hawthorne [2005]; Williamson [2000], ch. 10). Among others,
this is so because it is not clear how to determine the degree of belief an agent
would have in H given the “(counterfactual) supposition that [she] does not
yet know E.” That is, it is not clear how to determine the agent’s coun-
terfactual degree of belief function from her actual degree of belief function.
However, even if the counterfactual strategy were successful as a solution to
the problem of old evidence, it would still not help in escaping the negative
conclusion of our argument. The reason is that we need to know the agent’s
actual degree of belief function before we can determine her counterfactual
degree of belief function. Otherwise one cannot determine “the effect which
one believes a knowledge of E would now have on one’s degree of belief in
H.” In order to escape the negative conclusion of our argument one must
interpret the confirmation function as something that is not merely differ-
ent from, but also sufficiently independent of the agent’s degree of belief
function.
One way of doing so is to simply stipulate that there exists a confirmation
function that is sufficiently independent of, but nevertheless appropriately
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linked to, the agent’s degree of belief function. We call this strategy of
solving philosophical problems by simply postulating solutions to them the
deus ex machina strategy. The deus ex machina strategy is, of course, an
unacceptable move in philosophical theorizing. Presumably no philosopher
will ever seriously propose to solve a philosophical problem by it. However,
a bad strategy need not be a worst strategy. While there may not be a sharp
border separating good strategies from bad ones, other things being equal,
strategies are worse the closer they are to the extreme of the deus ex machina
strategy.
The deus ex machina strategy must not be confused with the indispens-
able move in philosophical theorizing of postulating that a notion of philo-
sophical interest is primitive. For instance, Williamson ([2000]) argues that
knowledge should, or at least may, be taken as primitive, among other things,
because attempts to reduce it to notions other than knowledge have failed.
He then proceeds to show that other notions of philosophical interest such
as assertibility and belief and evidence can be illuminated by, or even re-
duced to, knowledge. Another example is Woodward ([2003]) who shows
that one can say many illuminating things about direct causal relevance in
terms of other causal notions in a circular, but not viciously circular way. In
these two cases the existence and intelligibility of knowledge and causality
(that differs from direct causal relevance), respectively, are taken for granted.
While one generally has to argue for the existence and intelligibility of the
things one postulates, there are clearer cases such as those of knowledge and
causality where this is not so urgent, and less clear cases such as that of the
confirmation function where this is urgent. Williamson’s work on knowledge
and Woodward’s work on causality belong to the very best of contemporary
philosophy, even though their work bears some resemblance to the deus ex
machina strategy. It does so by giving up on attempts to reductive analysis,
and by stipulating that there exist such things as knowledge and causality
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and that they have the properties intuition says they have. Therefore it may
not be possible to completely do without elements of the deus ex machina
strategy. However, we clearly should try to work with as few of those ele-
ments as possible.
An account that stipulates that there exists a “degrees-of-support func-
tion” that is sufficiently independent of and appropriately linked to the
agent’s degree of belief function to play the role of the confirmation function
is presented in Hawthorne ([2005]). Hawthorne’s degrees-of-support function
is supposed to be a logical or quasi-logical conception of probability that rep-
resents objective or public likelihoods (Hawthorne [2005], pp. 298ff). While
Hawthorne ([2005]) states a link between his degrees-of-support function and
the agent’s degree of belief function, he does not say why we are entitled to
assume that there exists a degrees-of-support function. Nor does he tell us
how we could possibly determine the quasi-logical or logical degree-of-support
of a sentence or proposition. Therefore Hawthorne violates the criterion of
ascertainability that has been suggested by Salmon ([1966]) as a condition
of adequacy on interpretations of probability (the criterion is also favorably
discussed in Ha´jek [2012], sect. 2). “This criterion requires that there be
some method by which, in principle at least, we can ascertain values of prob-
abilities. It merely expresses the fact that a concept of probability will be
useless if it is impossible in principle to find out what the probabilities are”
(Salmon [1966], p. 64). Indeed, the only reason Hawthorne provides for the
existence of the degrees-of-support function is that it solves the problem of
old evidence. We think that this account bears too much resemblance to the
deus ex machina strategy.
A similar account is presented in Williamson ([2000], ch. 10), who stip-
ulates that there exists an “evidential probability” measure that plays the
role of the confirmation function. Having in mind the betting interpretation
of an agent’s degrees of belief Williamson explicitly rejects the demand for
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an operational definition of evidential probability and merely says that it
satisfies the axioms of the probability calculus. The only reason he provides
for the existence of the evidential probability measure is his dissatisfaction
with the notion of an agent’s rational degrees of belief. We agree that there
is no need for an operational definition of evidential probability. However,
we think that the agent’s betting behavior is merely used to measure, not
to define, the agent’s degrees of belief. In accordance with the above crite-
rion of ascertainability we think that a theory of measurement is something
highly desirable. Without such a theory more has to be said about why we
are entitled to assume that there exists an evidential probability measure.
As with Hawthorne’s account of degrees-of-support, but in stark contrast to
Williamson’s account of knowledge, we think that Williamson’s account of
evidential probability bears too much resemblance to the deus ex machina
strategy.
Hawthorne ([2005]) and Williamson ([2000], ch. 10) stipulate the exis-
tence of a degrees-of-support function and an evidential probability measure,
respectively. Taken as the confirmation function each would be sufficiently
independent of, but appropriately linked to, the agent’s degree of belief func-
tion in order for confirmation to be a means to the end of saying how worthy
of belief certain hypotheses are. However, we do not think these authors pro-
vide sufficient reason for us to be entitled to assume the existence of these
functions. Their accounts bear too much resemblance to the deus ex machina
strategy.
We both think that the only notion whose existence and intelligibility may
be safely assumed and which is sufficiently independent of, but appropriately
linked to, the agent’s degree of belief function, is the agent’s initial or a priori
degree of belief function. We both also think that this conclusively establishes
that there is no need for confirmation as a means to the end of saying how
worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. The general Bayesian framework
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answers this question satisfactorily and without reference to its supplement
Bayesian confirmation theory: Bayesian confirmation is a means with no end.
(We disagree about what, if anything, one should do about this, though. See
Bro¨ssel [ms]; Huber [2005a], [2005b], [2008a], [2008b].)
Therefore let us turn to the prospects of the second option according to
which confirmation is a means to some end other than saying how worthy of
belief certain hypotheses are.
4 Confirmation and the Value of Experiments
No Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used to say how worthy of
belief certain hypotheses are. However, this still leaves open the possibility
that confirmation is put to some other use. In this section we consider a
popular measure of incremental confirmation and show that it can be used
to measure the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to decide
which experiments to carry out by forming their expected epistemic values.
However, we also show that Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out – in
some cases explicitly, in others implicitly – that confirmation be used for this
purpose, and so defend our negative conclusion from the previous section.
One might argue that the epistemic value of an experimental outcome in
a test of a hypothesis for an agent consists in the difference the experimental
outcome would make to the agent’s degree of belief in the hypothesis. In the
literature this is referred to as “the potential further support” (Christensen
[1999]) or “the additional evidence provided by” (Milne [ms]) an experimental
outcome for a hypothesis for an agent.
Suppose an agent with actual degree of belief function Pr is testing the
hypothesis H by an experiment with possible experimental outcomes E and
¬E against background assumptions B. The difference the experimental out-
come E would make to the agent’s degree of belief in the hypothesis given the
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background assumptions can be measured by the Kemeny-Oppenheim mea-
sure of factual support F (Kemeny and Oppenheim [1952]; Fitelson [2001],




Pr (E | H ∩B)− Pr (E | ¬H ∩B)
Pr (E | H ∩B) + Pr (E | ¬H ∩B)
]
The difference the experimental outcome ¬E would make to the agent’s de-




Pr (¬E | H ∩B)− Pr (¬E | ¬H ∩B)
Pr (¬E | H ∩B) + Pr (¬E | ¬H ∩B)
]
For an agent with degree of belief function Pr the expected epistemic value
of an experiment E with possible experimental outcomes E and ¬E for hy-
pothesis H relative to background assumptions B can then be defined in the
standard decision-theoretic way as
F (H, E , B) = F (H,E,B) Pr (E | B) + F (H,¬E,B) Pr (¬E | B)
There are other measures of incremental confirmation besides F , and it is
an interesting question which one is best suited for measuring an agent’s
epistemic value of an experimental outcome for a hypothesis relative to some
background assumptions.
Importantly, though, Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out that any
measure of incremental confirmation be used for this purpose. For instance,
Christensen ([1999]) wants
to capture the support an agent’s confidence in H already receives
from E (in contrast to the potential further support that might be
gotten from raising Pr(E)). (Christensen [1999], p. 449, notation
adapted)
He thus explicitly rules out that confirmation be used to measure the epis-
temic value of experimental outcomes.
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Other philosophers follow Christensen in aiming at an explication of “ac-
tualized support” (Christensen [1999], p. 449) as opposed to potential fur-
ther support. More specifically, many Bayesian confirmation theorists are
committed to denying that a measure of confirmation quantifies potential
further support, even if they do not deny this explicitly. This can be seen
from the fact that they take the following to be a problem for their accounts
of incremental confirmation. Recall that evidence E incrementally confirms
hypothesis H relative to background assumption B and probability measure
Pr just in case Pr (H | E ∩B) > Pr (H | B). On this account, evidence E
which receives probability one relative to background assumptions B cannot
confirm or disconfirm any hypothesis H. The reason is that the conditional
probability of the hypothesis given the evidence and the background assump-
tions, Pr (H | E ∩B), equals the probability of the hypothesis given merely
the background assumptions, Pr (H | B), if the probability of the evidence
given the background assumptions equals one, Pr (E | B) = 1.
Evidence may receive probability one because it is trivial in the sense
that it is highly unspecific or even tautologous. However, on a Bayesian in-
terpretation of probability, evidence may also receive probability one because
it is old in the sense that it has been established beyond doubt. This strips
the confirmatory potential from highly non-trivial evidence that is maximally
believed to be true. Glymour ([1980]) cites the fact that the pre-existing ev-
idence of Mercury’s 43′′ arc advance of its perihelion was considered by most
physicists as compelling evidence for Einstein’s general theory of relativity as
one historical instance of this problem, which since is known as the problem
of old evidence.
Numerous attempts have been made to solve the problem of old evidence.
They range from claiming that Pr (E | B) is never one (Rosenkrantz [1983])
to counterfactually reassigning the probability of old evidence (Howson and
Urbach [1993], [2006]) to relocating the source of the problem in logical learn-
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ing (Garber [1983]; Jeffrey [1983b]; Niiniluoto [1983]).
All these philosophers apparently hold that old evidence is, or should be,
able to provide confirmation. More specifically, these philosophers apparently
hold that if c is a measure of confirmation, then it is, or should be, possible
that there is a piece of evidence E and a hypothesis H such that E is old given
the background assumptions B, Pr (E | B) = 1, and E confirms H relative
to B in the sense of c. However, if c is a measure of potential further support,
then c is a measure of incremental confirmation. In this case it is not possible
that there is a piece of evidence E and a hypothesis H such that E is old
given background assumptions B, Pr (E | B) = 1, and E confirms H relative
to B in the sense of c. Put differently, for potential further support, the
inability of old evidence to raise or lower the probability of some hypothesis
is a precondition rather than a problem. A measure of potential further
support cannot account for old evidence, nor should it. It cannot and should
not do so for the most general reason that old evidence has, by definition,
no potential to further support a hypothesis. Old evidence is, by definition,
unable to provide additional evidence for any hypothesis.
To sum up: old evidence cannot provide incremental confirmation, and
since potential further support is a form of incremental confirmation, old ev-
idence cannot provide potential further support. Therefore all philosophers
who take the problem of old evidence seriously cannot want to capture poten-
tial further support with their notions of confirmation. This in turn implies
that they implicitly rule out that confirmation be used to determine the epis-




In this paper we have argued that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can
be used for guiding or prescribing epistemic states or experimental actions.
In particular, we have argued that no Bayesian conception of confirmation
can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take to be saying
how worthy of belief certain hypotheses are. We have considered a different
use confirmation might be put to, namely to determine the epistemic value
of experimental outcomes, and so to decide which experiments to carry out.
We have seen that Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out that confirmation
be used for this purpose, either explicitly, or implicitly by taking the problem
of old evidence to be serious. We conclude that Bayesian confirmation is a
means with no end.
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